Ways to Deal Disinformation is something we would rather not encounter. However, it can be difficult to prevent incorrect information from being spread. Read this article to find out which interventions combat disinformation.
Background
This is the 2nd article in a series of 4 on disinformation. In the previous article we answer the question what disinformation is. In this article we will discuss interventions that combat disinformation.
Intervention types
Combating disinformation takes many forms: from cyberwarfare to mia literacy and from censorship to fact-checking. And then there are interventions in the form of debunking, flagging and street epistemology. It is difficult to see the forest for the trees. That is why it is necessary to bring some form of order to the tangle of options.
Target groups
One way to organize counter-disinformation interventions is to look at the target groups they are targeting. In principle, according to the European Union definition, there are only two target groups:
Those who deceive.
Those who can be deceiv.
Deceivers include all those who create present and spread disinformation
Difficult to classify
A difficult group to classify is the group of ordinary people who spread disinformation out of habit . On the one hand, this group could be consider deceivers because they spread disinformation. On the other hand, the group could be seen as deceiv because they fell for the tricks of the deceivers. The important thing is that the deceiv, who spread disinformation without bad intentions, can unintentionally cause considerable damage .
A similar problem exists with regard to mia and social mia. Mia often provide a platform for disinformation distributors bas on the principle of justice that all parties should be heard equally. Even when it concerns representatives of a splinter group with dubious sources of funding. Lee McIntyre (Post Truth, 2018) argues that a discussion in which representatives of disinformation participate is different. In such a discussion, it is not about parties trying to convince with opinions, but about a party trying to convince versus a party trying to subdue.
According to McIntyre, the mia are willing to be us by disseminators of disinformation. Partly because they benefit from it; intense confrontations with extreme opinions yield higher viewing figures and the confrontations require less preparation than a substantive treatment of a subject. Does that make the mia into deceivers or deceiv?
And what do you think of social mia? Their business model fits seamlessly with the scammers’ methods. They facilitate the immersion of people in information with the promise that this can change the behavior of these people. It is not important whether it concerns purchasing behavior or voting behavior. Does that make social mia scammers?
Adjustments
It seems sensible for mia and social mia to create a third target group: intermiaries. These intermiaries act as willing intermiaries. Transparency, accountability and responsibility must be demand of this intermiary, so that they cannot hide behind the argument that they too have been deceiv.
Unlike intermiaries, ordinary citizens who spread poland email list 2.3 million contact leads disinformation are not professionals. However, the European Union definition does not provide any tools to decide whether they are fraudsters or deceiv. A new criterion is ne to make this decision. A good criterion would be: is the spread of disinformation coordinat? If citizens are direct by those responsible for disinformation, or their collaborators, then they belong to the group of fraudsters. If not, then they are deceiv.
Target group classification
The classification into target groups makes it which one is right for you? easier for policymakers and disinformation fighters to choose a specific form of intervention. For each target group, there are specific alb directory types of interventions that can be deploy. For example, interventions concerning recipients of disinformation can focus on:
better information for this target group (from awareness campaigns to fact-checking),
on improving mia literacy skills (e.g. prebunking), or
on the social consequences of disinformation (for example, providing support to the environment of radicaliz friends or family members).